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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE S. WHITTING, JUDITH 
SILVA and DANIEL SILVA, 
d/b/a JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB, 
VS. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
CHARLES R. CLAYTON, Mayor 
of Midvale City, et al., 
and MIDVALE CITY, a 
municipal corporation, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 16543 
Appellants initiated this action in the Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, 
praying for an Extraordinary Writ to review and reverse the 
ruling of the City Council of the City of Midvale, which re-
voked the business licenses held by Appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding, entered 
its Order affirming the action of the City Council of the City 
of Midvale. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the District Court's 
Order which upheld the revocation of Appellants' business 
licenses. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants, George S. Whiting, Judith Silva and Daniel 
Silva, made application to Midvale City, a municipal 
corporation, located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
for a retail beer license, as partners in a partnership 
doing business under the name of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB on 
December 13, 1976 (TR 292). Said license was issued and 
receipt for the fees made December 17, 1976 (TR 291(1)). 
From the time of the opening of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB at 
7980 South State Street, Midvale, Utah, numerous complaints 
had been made by citizens in the immediate vicinity of 
JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB (TR 293, 294), the complaints being made 
by the citizens, including that of disturbing the peace, foul 
language, drunkenness, fights, parking in residential areas, 
littering, drag-racing, making public nuisance and destroying 
the residents' quiet enjoyment of their property (TR 292(2)(3)). 
As a result of the numerous complaints received by the Mayor, 
City Council and Police Department with respect to JUDD'S 
FRONTIER CLUB, Midvale City Corporation, by its Mayor, Boyd 
N. Twiggs, wrote a letter to George S. Whiting of JUDD'S 
FRONTIER CLUB, dated September 29, 1977, setting forth various 
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methods of resolving the complaints against JUDD'S FRONTIER 
CLUB (TR 20, 21). Again, on November 16, 1977, a letter 
was sent by Midvale City Corporation, through its Mayor, 
Boyd N. Twiggs, to George S. Whiting of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB, 
informing him of the many complaints in the area with 
respect to noise, fighting, lack of parking, broken glass 
and debris in street, and urinating in public. Appellants 
were informed at that time, that these problems had not 
existed prior to the opening of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB. 
The City again requested that remedial action be taken and 
that if the effectiveness of these measures would not solve 
the problem within thirty (30) days that Midvale City would 
consider suspending the licenses of Appellants (TR 18, 19). 
Thereafter, the Respondents, Midvale City Corporation, 
prepared a Petition and Notice of Charges (TR 282-288), 
and an Order to Show Cause, (TR28G-281), ordering the 
Appellants to appear before the Midvale City Council on 
the 26th day of April, 1978 at the hour of 7:00P.M., then 
and there to show cause, if any they had, why their licenses 
should not be suspended or revoked for the reasons as set 
forth therein. Said Petition and Notice of Charges and Order 
to Show Cause was served personally upon Judith Silva for 
the Appellants and upon Richard Leedy, Esq., Attorney for 
Appellants, on the 13th day of April, 1978 (TR 160, 280, 288 
(5)(6)). Thereafter, Richard J. Leedy, Attorney for Appellants, 
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brought suit in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, seeking a Temporary 
Restraining Order against Respondents from holding said 
revocation hearing. The Order to Show Cause on the Temporary 
Restraining Order was initially set for April 21, 1978, but 
was continued to May 4, 1978, at which time, Marc Nick Mascaro 
appeared for the Respondents and Richard J. Leedy appeared 
for the Appellants. On May 8, 1978, David K. Winder, District 
Judge, denied Appellant's Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order or Preliminary Injunction. Respondents, Midvale City, 
rescheduled the Order to Show Cause hearing for May 16, 1978 
at the hour of 6:00P.M., which said notice was served by 
mailing a NOTICE OF HEARING to Richard J. Leedy, attorney for 
Appellants, the 9th day of May, 1978 (TR 289). 
Pursuant to the above NOTICE OF HEARING on May 16, 1978, 
Midvale City, a municipal corporation, brought the Order to 
Show Cause hearing against JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB to consider 
the suspension or revocation of the club's licenses and 
regulatory licenses pursuant to Section 7-18, REVISED ORDINANCES 
OF MIDVALE CITY, 1951, and such other inherent powers as are 
vested in the City Council of Midvale City. Richard J. 
Leedy appeared as attorney for Appellants (TR 153, 154, 159, 
164, 165-75), having accepted service for said hearings 
(TR 160); Judith Silva and Daniel Silva were also present 
(TR 156, 161). Marc Nick Mascaro, Midvale City Attorney, 
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appeared for Respondents. At that time, members of the 
Midvale City Council received evidence and took testimony 
from Respondents' witnesses. At the conclusion of Respondents' 
evidence, the Appellants presented no evidence (TR 267). 
Based upon the evidence and testimony taken at the hearing, 
the Midvale City Council, on May 30, 1978, at a special 
council meeting, at which time, Mr. Richard J. Leedy, 
attorney for Appellants, was present, entered its Findings of 
Fact and Order (TR 102-106), finding INTER ALIA, that since 
the opening of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB in Midvale City, the 
residents in the immediate vicinity of said club, had 
experiences fights, (TR 180, 187, 188, 227, 232, 249 and 260), 
excessive noise (TR 179, 182, 193, 206, 221, 223 and 232), 
extreme parking problems (TR 193, 199, 205, 214, 215, 218, 
219, 227, 232, 260), broken .beer bottles and litter (TR 179, 
181, 182, 188, 200, 205, 206, 213, 215, 223, 227, 234, 247, 
260, urinating in public (TR 181, 193, 194, 195, 198, 199, 201, 
205, 207, 225, 227, 232, 234, 247, 260), vulgar and indecent 
S language (TR 179, 181, 194, 206, 223, 227, 232, 260), intoxi-
cated individuals (TR 220, 232, 233, 260), destruction of 
private property (TR 181, 193, 199, 205, 214, 221, 227), loss 
of rents and tenants in apartment units (TR 206, 214), loss 
of quiet enjoyment of private residences (TR 179, 193, 194, 
201, 202, 213, 214, 220, 223, 224), diminished property values 
(TR 207, 224), personal injuries (TR 214, 227, 236), drag 
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racing (TR 182, 206), narcotics (TR 260). The City Council 
further found that said activities were carried on by the 
patrons of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB as evidenced by the testimony 
of neighbors and police officers and by the acknowledgements 
of patrons (TR 179, 181, 189, 191, 194, 200, 205, 210, 211, 
225, 227, 234, 245 and 260). Testimony from long-time 
residents of the immediate vicinity of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB, 
with residency ranging from two and one-half (2-1/2) years 
to thirty five (35) years, indicated that the residents had 
had no prior problems of the nature above-described prior 
to the establishment and opening of JUPD'S FRONTIER CLUB 
(TR 179, 181, 192, 193, 198, 200, 205, 209, 213, 215, 217, 
221, 223, 224, 226 and 234). Of the eight (8) residents 
called, six (6) testified that the above activities carried 
on by the patrons of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB took place at 
least three (3) to five (5) nights each week (TR 182, 194, 
215, 217, 223, 228 and 262). Based upon the testimony and 
evidence of the above activities, the Midvale City Council 
found that said activities were contrary to the public 
peace and morals of the citizens of Midvale City, and there-
fore, in contravention of Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY 
ORDINANCES, 1951, as revised (TR 102, 103). The City 
Council further found that the above-named activities were 
carried on with the knowledge of Appellants, who were sent 
letters September 29, 1977 (TR 20) and November 16, 1977 
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(TR 18), notifying Appellants of said conduct. That said 
activities constituted a nuisance pursuant to Section 7-2, 
MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES, 1951, as revised, and that 
violations of Section 7-2 and 7-18 of the MIDVALE CITY 
ORDINANCES of conduct tending to affect the public peace and 
morals of Midvale City, was grounds for revocation of 
Appellant's licenses (TR 103, 104). 
The City Council further found that Appellants were 
allowing public dancing without a license in violation of 
Section 4-25, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES, as revised (TR 104, 105), 
and that said violation was grounds for revocation under 
Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES. The City Council 
further found that on the nights when Appellants were allow-
ing public dancing, beer was being sold in contravention of 
Section 7-10, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES, 1951, as revised, 
which violation was grounds for revocation pursuant to 
Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES (TR 105). The Council 
further found that based upon the testimony that the City was 
spending between one-third (1/3) and one-half (1/2) of its 
police force time patroling JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB which caused 
serious problems with respect to the protection of the 
property and residents in other parts of the city, (TR 214, 
232, 233,234, 235, 261, 262); that said conduct was 
contrary to the public peace and morals of Midvale City all 
in contravention of Section 7-18, MIDVALE CITY ORDINANCES, 
1951, as revised, and was grounds for revocation of Appellants' 
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licenses (TR 103, 104). Based upon the above findings of 
the Midvale City Council, it voted on May 30, 1978, to revoke 
the business license, beer license and three (3) amusement 
device licenses of Appellants by a vote of three (3) for 
revoking all licenses, one abstaining and one absent (TR 
105, 106). 
Thereafter, Appellants, through their attorney, Richard 
J. Leedy, filed a Verified Complaint in the Third District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, challenging 
the revocation hearing held by Midvale City Council and 
the ordinances used therein (TR 2-8). Subsequent to various 
hearings, Appellants, through their attorney, Nick J. 
Collesides, filed a Verified Amended Complaint and Petition 
for Extraordinary Writ, dated January 26, 1979 (TR 82-86). 
Respondents filed an Answer to the Verified Amended Com-
plaint and the Verified Complaint on January 31, 1979 
(TR 90-94), and pursuant to the Order of Judge Bryant H. 
Croft, certified the record of Midvale City Corporation to 
the Third Judicial District Court (TR 100). 
The matter came on for judicial review before the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, 
presiding on the 12th day of June, 1979, pursuant to Rule 
6S(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to review the 
action of Midvale City Council in revoking Appellant's 
licenses. Nick J. Collesides appeared for Appellants and 
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Marc Nick Mascaro appeared for Respondents. 
On June 25, 1979, the Court reviewed the transcript of 
the City Council's hearing, the record on appeal, the Findings 
of Fact and Order of the Midvale City Council, heard oral 
arguments from both counsel and affirmed the action of the 
Midvale City Council (TR 128, 129). The Court thereafter 
on July 3, 1979, entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (TR 137-142), finding~~; that the action of 
the City Council was within the statutory authority of that 
body to act; that the evidence given at the hearing was 
sufficient to support the action revoking the said licenses; 
that said action was based upon competent evidence; that 
the said hearing comported with all requirements of due 
process and equal protection; that the said ordinances were 
constitutional; and that the action of Midvale City Council 
was not arbitrary or capricious. Based upon its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusionsof Law, the Court entered its 
Amended Order of Judgment dated July 3, 1979, affirming the 
action of the Midvale City Council (TR 143, 144). 
On June 27, 1979, Appellants filed their Notice of 
Appeal (TR 130), and on August 20, 1979, Appellants filed 
an Amended Notice of Appeal from the Judgment entered 
July 3, 1979 (TR 304). 
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POINT I 
RESPONDENTS PROPERLY REVOKED THE BUSINESS 
LICENSES OF APPELLANTS AND SAID DECISION 
MUST STAND UNLESS SHOWN TO BE ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
It is well established law that Courts will not attempt 
to control or interfere with the discretion of a municipal 
legislative body relative to the granting or denying of a 
license or a revocation or cancellation thereof. All 
reasonable doubts as to the correctness of the licensing 
authorities' rulings should be resolved in its favor. Accord-
ingly, Courts will not question or set aside license or per-
mit requirements or exactions, or the granting, denial or 
revocation of licenses or permits by municipal authorities, 
except for oppressiveness, discrimination or clear abuse of 
power or discretion. 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 
Section 26.93. This Honorable Court has consistently follow-
ed the general applicable law above stated. 
The review power of the District Court over adminis-
trative actions is set forth in Rule 65(b)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, wherein relief in the form of an Extra-
ordinary Writ is permitted in the following situations: 
Where an inferior tribunal, Board or Officer 
exercising judicial function has exceeded its 
jurisdiction or abused its discretion. 
10 
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In exercising that review power, this Court in the 
case of Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 
589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979), held that the licensing of a 
business: 
. . . should not be destroyed nor disrupted 
arbitrarily, nor without following fundamental 
standards of due process of law to guard 
against capricious or oppressive administrative 
action. 
. . . the operating business should have its 
license renewed unless there is some reasonable 
basis for denying it. (emphasis added) Id. at 
mr. 
Because the record of the trial court and 
particularly its findings upon which the 
judgment is based, fail to demonstrate any 
reasonable ground for the refusal to renew the 
license, ~t is our conclusion that judgment 
should be and is hereby vacated. (emphasis 
added) Id. at 1217. 
Thus, this Court has clearly established the standard that 
if there is any reasonable basis for the denial of a license, 
the decision of the administrative tribunal must stand. 
This Court in the case of Peatross v. Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281, (Utah 1976), 
spoke to the review power of the District Court over admin-
istrative actions . 
. . . where the lower tribunal, acting within 
the scope of its authority, has conducted a 
hearing and arrived at a decision, the review-
ing court will examine only the certified 
record; and will not interfere with matters of 
discretion or upset the actions of the lower 
tribunal except upon a showing that the 
tribunal acted in excess of its authority or 
in a manner so clearly outside reason that its 
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action must be deemed capr~c~ous and 
arbitrary. Id.at 284. 
Thus, it is clear that the action by the administrative 
tribunal must stand unless the decision rendered is "so 
clearly outside reason that its action must be deemed capri-
cious and arbitrary." 
The Supreme Court of Nevada announced a similar standard 
of review in Kochendorfer v. Board of County Commissioners 
of Douglas County, 93 Nev. 419, 566 P.2d 1131 (1977). In 
that case, the Court quashed a Writ of Mandamus and reinstated 
the order of the Board revoking a six-month temporary liquor 
license on the basis of excessive noise complaints. The 
Court therein held that the burden of proof was on the 
applicant to show that the Board had acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. 
Similarly in Webster v. Board of County Commissioners 
of City of Adams, Colo. App. 539 P.2d 511 (1975), the 
Colorado Supreme Court explained that the decision of an 
administrative board is arbitrary and capricious where it is 
based upon evidence from which reasonable men, fairly and 
honestly considering the evidence, could only reach a con-
clusion contrary to that reached by the board. 
Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of Police 
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, 169 Cal. App. 2d 188, 
337 P.2d 203 (1959), is in accord. The Court stated that the 
City's Board of Police Commissioners, acting as a quasi 
12 
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judicial body, and was empowered to make final ajudications 
of fact with regard to matters properly submitted to it. 
A Court in reviewing such decision, has no right to judge 
the value of the evidence or weigh it. The Court is only 
to decide if there is substantial evidence to support the 
findings and should disregard all evidence contrary to those 
findings. 
This Court, in speaking of its review power of District 
Courts, has consistently held that where there is any reason-
able basis in the evidence to support the findings of a trial 
court, the findings will not be overturned. In Holman v. 
Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976), this Court stated: 
The policy of this court has been, after 
reviewing the record, not to disturb the 
trial court's findings if there is any 
reasonable basis and evidence to support 
it. Appellants carry out the burden of 
showing from the record that the lower 
court erred. 
See also First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons 
& Reed, 27 Utan-2d 1, 492 P.Zd. 132 (1971). 
The recent case of Hanover Ltd v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1977), explains the standard which Appellants must 
meet if the trial Judge's findings are to be reversed. The 
Court stated: 
In regard to the remaining assertions of 
error this court is constrained to look 
at th~ whole of the evidence in the light 
favorable to the trial court's findings, 
including any fair inferences t? be drawn 
from the evidence and all the c~rcumstances 
13 
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shown. The trial court's findings shall 
not be disturbed unless the evidence-rs-
such that all reasonable minds would be 
persuaded to the contrary. (emphas~s 
added) Id. at 753. 
Even when the parties to an action each produce evidence 
supporting its action, this Court has consistently refused 
to reverse the trial Court unless the evidence is so con-
vincing that reasonable men could not differ as to the 
results which the evidence dictated. Koesling v. Basamakis, 
539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975). 
Thus, it is clear that the trial Court will not be over-
turned if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support the findings. At the same time, the Appellant must 
show that "all reasonable minds would be persuaded to the 
contrary" before the lower Court can be reversed. 
The relief the Appellants seek on appeal is a 
Restraining Order against the Respondents "until the Com-
plaint on file with the District Court has been heard on 
its merits". It would seem that the Appellants in essence, 
are again asking for an evidentiary hearing or trial de novo 
in the District Court. This Court in Peatross, supra, held: 
The standard rule is that the appellate 
jurisdiction is the authority to review the 
actions or judgments of an inferior tribunal 
upon the record made in that tribunal, and 
to aff~rm, mod~fy or reverse such action or 
judgment. 
. . . where the Defendant Board had conducted 
a hearing that comported with due process 
requirements, and where there is no express 
statutory grant of a trial de novo, the 
14 
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plaintiff was mistaken in her insistence that 
she was entitled to one as a matter of right. 
555 P.2d at 284. 
The Court went on to indicate that because the issuance of 
an Extraordinary Writ was in the nature of a proceeding in 
equity that the trial Court could take evidence if it thought 
that the interest of justice so required. See also Denver & 
Rio Grande Railroad v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement 
District, 4 Ut. 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955). 
THE EVIDENCE 
In this matter, there is clearly a reasonable basis in 
the evidence to support the findings of the trial court and 
the findings of the Midvale City Council, Respondent's herein. 
In the hearing before the Midvale City Council hel.d May 16, 
1978, the City produced eight (8) property owners who resided 
in the immediate vicinity of said business. Those residents, 
who had lived in the area from two and a half (2-l/2) to 
thirty five (35) years, testified that prior to the commence-
ment of business by the Appellants, there had been no 
problems of the nature which they were experiencing. (See 
Statement of Facts, page 6) These residents testified of 
fights, noise, parking problems, litter, urinating in public, 
foul language, intoxication, destruction of property, loss 
of rents, loss of tenants, loss of the quiet enjoyment and 
use of their property, diminished property values, personal 
injuries and drag-racing. (See Statement of Facts, pages 
5 and 6) 
15 
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The City Council and District Court properly found that 
these actions were contrary to the public peace and morals 
of the citizens of Midvale City (TR 103, 138). The Midvale 
City Council and District Court further found, based upon 
the above testimony of these injurious activities, that 
they constituted a nuisance pursuant to Midvale City Ordinance 
7-2 (1951, as revised), (TR 104, 140). The Respondents and 
the District Court further found that the Appellants were 
aware of the activities of their patrons and were notified 
on several occasions of these problems (TR 104, 140) . 
At the hearing, the City further produced testimony 
from two (2) police officers who had been with the Midvale 
City Police Department for ten (10) years and six (6) years 
respectively, who testified that the Appellants were allow-
ing dancing, open to the public, and that said dancing was 
being carried on without a proper license as required by 
Midvale City (TR 104, 141). Said officers further testified 
and the City Council and District Court found that liquor 
was being sold during the time that public dancing was being 
carried on in Appellants' business location, which is in 
violation of Midvale City ordinances (TR 105, 141). 
The City Council heard substantial testimony that the 
injurious activities set forth above were being carried on 
by the patrons of JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB (see Statement of 
Facts, pages 6 and 7), and further, that the Midvale City 
Police Department was spending an inordinate amount of time 
16 
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policing the Appellants' business all to the detriment of 
the rest of the citizens of Midvale City (see Statement of 
Facts, page 7), and the District Court so found (TR 141). 
Appellants would indicate that the Midvale City Council 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. However, the record as 
set forth hereinabove, is replete with injurious activities 
which constitute conduct contrary to the public peace and 
morals of Midvale City and in violation of the ordinances 
therein named. 
Appellants elected at the public hearing on May 16, 1978, 
not to introduce any controverting evidence (TR 140, 267). 
Their attempt to present their entire evidence at the District 
Court level was improper. In Strader v. Kansas Public 
Employees Retirement System, 206 Kan. 392, 479 P.2d 860 (1971), 
the Court held that the Plaintiff could not secure independent 
review of an administrative proceeding: 
We would suggest that a party appearing before 
an administrative body cannot produce his 
evidence piecemeal. He cannot produce part 
of his evidence before an administrative agency 
and then produce the balance on judicial review. 
Id. at 868. 
To allow the Appellants to have an evidentiary hearing or 
trial de novo would be contrary to law and justice in this 
matter. The Midvale City Council had the benefit of 
observing the witnesses during their testimony and saw the 
evidence produced. They found sufficient evidence to revoke 
Appellant's licenses for violation of Section 7-18, 7-2, 4-25 
and 7-10, Midvale City Ordinances, (1951, as revised). The 
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District Court had the benefit of the certified record on 
appeal and reviewed the same. That Court, on review, found 
sufficient evidence to affirm the revocation of Appellants' 
business licenses and found that said evidence was competent 
and neither arbitrary nor capricious (TR 141). 
Appellants would have this Honorable Court believe that 
the trial Court did not rule on every issue raised in its 
Verified Complaint and Amended Verified Complaint. However, 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Amended Order of Judgment entered by the trial Court found 
upon each and every issue raised by Appellants on review 
(TR 128, 129, 137, 144). Based upon the findings made by 
Midvale City Council and the trial Court, this Court should 
uphold the decision of the District Court and lower tribunal. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS REVOKED THE APPELLANTS' 
BUSINESS LICENSE UNDER PROPER AUTHORITY. 
Appellants contend that, to halt the raucous activities 
at and around JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB, Respondents were re-
quired to bring an action for the abatement of a nuisance, 
an action which, they state, is "exclusively within the 
province of the district and subject to the Rules of the 
Civil Procedure" (sic). 
This reasoning is erroneous on several points. First, 
18 
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assuming arguendo that the City of Midvale were required to 
abate the nuisance rather than to revoke the license, the 
Utah State Code does indeed give a municipality such power: 
[Municipalities] may declare what shall be 
a nuisance, and abate same, and impose fines 
upon persons who may create, continue or 
suffer nuisances to exist. 
Utah Code Annotated, §10-8-60 (emphasis added). 
McQuillin is in accord, contrary to Appellants' assertions. 
The section quoted in portion by Appellants (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7) reads in full as follows: 
§ 24.64. To declare particular thing or 
business a nuisance. 
The power of a municipal corporation to define, 
declare, and deal with nuisances is restricted, 
the view has been taken, to defining, declaring 
what constitutes, and dealing with nuisances in 
general or with a class of things as nuisances, 
and is not a power to declare a particular thing, 
such as a building, a nuisance. A municipal 
legislative body's pronouncement that a particular 
industry, e.g., an oil refinery, is a nuisance, 
where neither charter nor ordinance makes it a 
nuisance, is not a legislative determination but 
an unauthorized judicial pronouncement; it is 
a counterpart of the case where an ordinance 
provides that no one shall carry on a certain 
business in the absence of a permit without 
specifying any standard for the issuance of the 
permit. Under a general ordinance setting a 
standard of un~form a !~cation, however, a 
act~n ~n an 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 Mcquillan, Municihal Coraorations, § 24.64 
(3rd Ed. 1964) (emp asis a ded; footnotes 
omitted). 
The later statement, upon which Appellant so strongly 
relies (that a business may be declared a nuisance after a 
finding by a Court of competent jurisdiction in the premises) 
clearly means, when read in the context of the entire section, 
only that if a Court finds a business to be a nuisance, a 
municipality may follow suit. It does not, as Appellant 
contends, state that a judicial hearing is required before 
a municipality may revoke a license on nuisance grounds. 
Section 76-10-808 of the Utah State Criminal Code, to 
which Appellantrefers in his brief, does provide for the 
abatement of nuisances, but it is by no means the exclusive 
vehicle for doing so. That section merely empowers the state 
attorney general, county attorney or city attorney to bring 
an action, either civil or criminal, for the abatement of a 
nuisance or install other appropriate penalties. Section 
78-38-1, to which Appellant also refers, is even further off 
point. It merely provides that a private ~. whose 
personal enjoyment is affected by a nuisance, may sue for 
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an abatement. 
More importantly, however, Appellant, in his labored 
attempt to bring the City Council's action within the purview 
of nuisance abatement, fails to realize that the revocation 
of a license and the abatement of a nuisance are not mutually 
exclusive remedies. 
The Courts, have, on numerous occasions, upheld the 
power of municipalities to refuse or revoke business licenses 
on nuisance grounds, as in Wallace v. Mayor of the City of 
Reno, 27 Nev. 71, 73 P. 528 (1903). There the City Council's 
revocation of a retail liquor dealer's license was upheld 
where there was reason to believe the business constituted 
a nuisance, a menace to public health, and a detriment to 
peace or morals. 
More recently, in Kochendorfer v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Douglas County, supra, the Court of that 
state quashed a Writ of Mandamus and reinstated the order of 
the board revoking a six-month temporary liquor license on 
the basis of noise complaints. 
Similarly, Sunset Amusement Company v. Board of Police 
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3rd 64, 
101 Cal. Rptr. 768, 496 P.2d 840 (lW~. concerned the propriety 
of a municipality refusing to renew a business license where 
such business created a public nuisance. Reviewing the 
board's findings that the business in question caused con-
siderable disruption in the vicinity of the roller rink, 
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including fights, a high crime incidence, public drunkenness 
and a general law enforcement problem in the area, the Court 
upheld the municipality's denial of a license renewal. 
The Court reached the same conclusion in Sultan Turkish 
Bath, Inc. v. Board of Police Commissioners of the City of 
Los Angeles, 169 Cal. App.2d 188, 337 P.2d 203 (1959), 
sustaining the board's business license revocation where the 
establishment created a public nuisance. 
Also on point is The Grog House, Inc., v. Oregon Liquor 
Control Commission, 12 Or. App. 426, 507 P.2d 419, 423 (1973), 
where the Court upheld the commission's refusal to renew a 
liquor license, noting evidence of "disorderly, illegal 
operations over a period of several months which grossly 
disturbed a neighborhood." 
It is ironic that Appellant places so much reliance on 
McQuillin to bolster his position; for that authority himself 
states: 
A license to carry on a business which affects 
health, safety, morals or the public welfare 
may be revoked by virtue of the police power. 
Where the granting of a license or permit forms 
a part of the police system of the state, as in 
the sale of intoxicating liquors, the authority 
which grants the license always retains the 
power to revoke it ... 
9 Mc~uillin, Municipal Corporations, § 26.83 (3rd 
ed. 964). 
That the Midvale City Council has such licensing power is 
clear under Utah Code Annotated, § 10-13-6: 
10-13-6. License of specified businesses.-- They 
may license, tax, regulate, suppress and prohiDit 
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(emphasis added). 
Appellants' position is confusing and untenable. While they 
state in the first section of their brief that the City 
Council, who concededly granted their business license, was 
required to bring an action for an abatement of a nuisance, 
they later state in another section that "[t]here is little 
question that the revocation of a liquor license itself 
ordinarily rests in the studied discretion of the body which 
has been delegated such power" (Appellants' Brief, p. 10). 
On the same page, they also state that: "a business license 
may be revoked by the issuing authority for legal cause; with 
that Appellants do not quarrel." 
As the cases clearly show, the City Council acted within 
proper authority when, in the interest of public welfare, 
peace and morals, it revoked the Appellants' business licenses. 
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POINT III 
WHERE THE MIDVALE CITY COilltCIL CONDUCTED A 
HEARING COMPORTING WITH DUE PROCESS AND 
HEARD EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO DETERMINE THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7-2, 
7-10, 4-35 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
MIDVALE CITY (1951), THE SAID CITY COUNCIL 
WAS AUTHORIZED PURSUANT TO SECTION 7-18 OF 
SAID ORDINANCE AND SECTIONS 10-13-6 AND 
32-4-17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) AS 
AMENDED, TO REVOKE PLAINTIFFS' BUSINESS 
LICENSES. 
Appellants contend that the evidence before the City 
Council established insufficient grounds for revocation and 
that, as a matter of due process, he was entitled to a trial 
de~ before the District Court. Appellants base such 
contention, in part, on the argument that the three (3) weeks 
which they were given to prepare their case before the Midvale 
City Council hearing of May 16, 1978 were inadequate. 
The trial Court found that the Defendants were given 
notice of an Order to Show Cause hearing for April 26, 1978, 
pursuant to a Petition and Notice of Charges dated April 12, 
1978, which Order to Show Cause and Petition and Notice of 
Charges was served upon Judith Silva, a partner of Appellants, 
and Richard J. Leedy, Esq., attorney for Appellants, on 
April 13, 1978 (TR 280, 288 (5 and 6), 160). After a 
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continuance of the original setting, a subsequent Notice of 
Hearing was served upon Richard J. Leedy, attorney for 
Appellants, on May 9, 1978, for a hearing to be had May 16, 
1978 (TR 289). The Court further found that the hearing held 
by Midvale City Council on May 16, 1978, comported in all 
respects with those requirements of due process and equal 
protection under the constitution; that Appellants were repre-
sented by counsel, Richard J. Leedy, Esq.; and that two (2) 
members of the partnership, namely Judith Silva and Daniel 
Silva, were present at said hearing (TR 138, 140). The trial 
Court further found that a full and complete hearing was had 
on the matter before the Midvale City Council, but that the 
Appellants elected not to introduce any controverting 
evidence at that time (TR 138, 140). The trial Court further 
found that after said hearing, the Midvale City Council took 
the matter under advisement and on May 30, 1978, entered its 
decision revoking the business license, Class B Beer License 
and three (3) amusement device licenses of Appellants, at 
which time, Richard J. Leedy, Esq., attorney for Appellants, 
was present (TR 138). 
In The Grog House, supra, the Court held that one-and-one 
half (1-1/2) days were sufficient preparation time where "the 
evidence against petitioners was overwhelming testimony con-
cerning disorderly, illegal operations over a period of several 
months which grossly disturbed a neighborhood." 507 P. 2d at 
423. The Court noted that the evidence before the commission 
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showed that the Appellant had been repeatedly warned by 
police of the shortcomings of his establishment and that 
"this was the kind of evidence, if there had been contra 
evidence, that would have been readily rebuttable." Id. 
In this matter, the trial Court concluded as a matter 
of law that the Respondents conducted a hearing comporting 
in all respects with due process and equal protection; that 
the hearing was held within the scope of the Respondent's 
authority; and that the tribunal acted upon competent and 
sufficient evidence and that their actions were neither 
arbitrary nor capricious (TR 140, 141). The trial Co~t 
further upheld the constitutionalityof the ordinances used 
in the revocation, 7-18, 7-2 and 4-25 (TR 141). Therefore, 
the decison should stand. See Peatross, supra. 
The Supreme Court of Nevada in the Kochendorfer, supra, 
noting that the central elements of due process are notice 
and hearing appropriate to the case, found that any due 
process rights of Plaintiff's which might have been violated 
by a first hearing without notice were amply protected by a 
second hearing within a ten-day notice, the presence of counsel 
and an opportunity to be heard. The Court also found that 
there was sufficient evidence to support the board's 
revocation based on maintenance of a public nuisance and the 
diminished value of adjoining property. 
Appellants also maintain that the City Council's dual 
function as Prosecutor and Judge is violative of due process. 
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Nevertheless, the Court, in Palm Gardens, Inc. v. Oregon 
Liquor Control Commission, 15 Or. App. 20, 514 P.2d 888 
(1973), rejected such a challenge: 
The case law, both federal and state, 
generally rejects the idea that the com-
bination with judging or prosecuting or 
investigating functions is a denial of 
due process . 
Id. at 895, quoting 2 Davis, Administrative 
Law, Section 13.02 (1958). 
The combination of prosecutory and adjudicatory 
functions in a single agency is not con-
sidered to be a violation of due process 
guarantees. 
Id. quoting 1 Cooper, State Administrative Law, 
J!9 (1965). 
In the case at bar, the City Council is authorized by 
Utah Code Annotated, 10-D-6 and 32-4-17, (1953) as amended, 
to license, regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating 
liquor and beer. Those sections state: 
10-13-6. License of specified businesses.---
The license, tax, re ulate, su ress and 
pro ~ ~t ~ ~ar s, poo , agate e, p~geon ole, 
and any other table or implement kept or used 
for similar purposes; license and regulate 
hotel and tavern keepers, eating houses, 
restaurants, theaters, picture shows, merchants, 
grocers, peddlers, butchers, slaughterers, 
druggists, apothecaries and photographers, and 
any business within the town; may prohibit the 
manufacturing, selling, giving away or disposition 
in any manner of any intoxicating liquor contrary 
to law, or the maintaining of places where such 
liquors are being kept for such purpose, or the 
obtaining of such liquors by fraud from any 
practicing physician or druggist, or in any 
manner aiding in the selling, giving away, 
manufacturing, keeping, distributing or disposition 
of such intoxicating liquor contrary to law. 
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32-4-17. Retail licenses-Light beer-Sale to 
minors. (a) Cities and towns within their 
corporate limits, and counties outside of 
incorporated cities and towns shall have power 
to license, tax, regulate or prohibit the sale 
of light beer, at retail, in bottles or draft; 
provided, that no such licenses shall be 
granted to sell beer in any dance hall, theater 
or in the proximity of any church or school. 
The commission granting the license shall have 
the authority to determine in each case, what 
shall constitute proximity. (b) In addition 
to other penalties which are provided in this 
act, the license of any person to sell light 
beer shall either be revoked or suspended for a 
period of not less than thirty (30) days, upon 
conviction of selling or furnishing beer to a 
minor. 
(emphasis added) . 
Section 7-18 of the Midvale Revised Ordinances, (1951), 
authorizes the City Council to revoke licenses when "necessary 
for the protection of public peace or morals," and states 
that "any license shall be revoked if the . . . licensee . 
fails to comply with the ordinances of Midvale City . 
The trial Court found that, as a matter of fact, 
Appellants' business has experienced "traffic and parking 
problems, fights, noise, accidents, obscene conduct, profanity, 
trespass and other injurious activities" and that said 
injurious activities were contrary to the public peace and 
morals of Midvale City (TR 138-141). 
The Appellants in the instance case were afforded notice 
and a hearing at which the Council heard evidence sufficient 
to conclude that JUDD'S FRONTIER CLUB created a traffic 
problem and a crime problem injurious to the public peace 
or morals; that the club constituted a nuisance within the 
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meaning of Section 7-2 of the Midvale City Ordinances Revised, 
(1951) in that laws or ordinances were violated by its 
patrons tending to affect the public health, peace, or morals; 
and that the club was in violation of Sections 7-2, 7-10 and 
4-34 of the Midvale City Ordinances Revised, (1951), by virtue 
of its allowing public dancing without a license and selling 
beer to patrons while dancing was in progress (TR 149-142) . 
Since the Council's actions were in compliance with due 
process and based on substantial evidence, their license 
revocation must be upheld. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO ASSERT THAT 
SECTION 7-18 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT IT PEIU-ITTS THE 
REVOCATION OF A BUSINESS LICENSE WITHOUT A 
HEARING. 
Section 7-18 of the Revised Ordinances of Midvale City, 
(1951), sets forth proceedings and grounds for liquor license 
application, rejection, suspension, and revocation of such 
licenses: 
Section 7-18. The City Council may with or 
without a hearing at its discretion, when 
in their opinion it is necessary for the 
protection of public peace or morals, refuse 
to grant any license applie~ for an~ may 
revoke any license at any t~me and ~n no 
case need any cause be stated. No license 
shall be issued and license issued shall 
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be revoked if the applicant or licensee 
shall not possess or shall cease to 
possess all of the qualifications required 
by the Liquor Control Act and by the 
ordinances of Midvale City or fails to 
comply with the ordinances of Midvale City 
or rules, regulations and orders of the 
Board of Health relating to health matters. 
Appellants contend that, because the ordinance permits 
revocation of a license without a hearing, it is an un-
constitutional violation of due process. 
Appellants have no standing to make such an assertion. 
They received a hearing before the City Council prior to the 
revocation of their license and were represented by counsel 
at that time: 
An asserted violation of due process can be 
urged only by those who claim an impairment 
of their rights in the application of the 
statute to them. 
Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978). 
In Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 25 Utah 2d 333, 481 P.2d 669 
(1971), Plaintiffs sought to challenge the constitutionality 
of a statute requiring permission of local authorities before 
a liquor license could be granted. Since Plaintiffs did 
not allege in their Complaint that any local authorities 
had refused to give consent for the Liquor Control 
Commission to issue them licenses, the Court held that they 
had no standing: 
Before a party may attack the constitution-
ality of a statute, he must be adversely 
affected by that very statute. The court 
will not listen to an objection made as 
to the constitutionality of an act by 
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parties whose rights are not specifically 
affected. 
~· at 671. 
Similarly, in Strader v. Kansas Public Employees 
Retirement System, supra, the Court dismissed a claim that 
the Retirement System violated due process in that it did 
not provide for the subpoenaing of witnesses where there 
was no indication that the Appellant intended to present 
evidence in any form other than oral testimony on his own 
behalf. 
Constitutionality of legislation or of due 
process before an administrative body will 
be considered by the courts only where 
necessarily involved and such constitution-
ality may not be questioned by one not 
affected by its operation. 
479 P.2d at 862. 
POINT V 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANTS DO HAVE 
STANDING, SECTION 7-18 OF THE MIDVALE CITY 
ORDINANCES IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
OF DUE PROCESS BY VIRTUE OF THAT ORDINANCE 
ALLOWING A LICENSE REVOCATION BY THE CITY 
COUNCIL WITH OR WITHOUT A HEARING. 
McQuillin states that: 
(T]here is no contract or vested right.or 
property in a license or permit as aga1nst 
the power of the state or a municipality to 
revoke it for cause or in the exercise of 
the police power to protect the public health, 
safety, morals or welfare ... 
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Especially with respect to licenses or 
permits for those business, activities or 
things potentially or frequently unlawful, 
such as the sale of intoxicating liquors, 
there is no vested interest in a license 
or permit or in its continuance, and it 
can be revoked at the pleasure of the 
municipality, provided the revocation is 
not arbitrary, unreasonable, or 
discriminatory. 
McQuillin, supra, § 26.81 
A majority of jurisdictions agree that the revocation 
of a liquor license without notice or hearing does not 
violate due process. Annot., "Right to a hearing before 
revocation or suspension of liquor license," 35 A.L.R. 2d 
1067 (1945). It has bng been held that such a license does 
not constitute a contractual or vested right, but a mere 
permit to do what would otherwise be unlawful. Thus in 
Wallace v. Mayor of the City of Reno, supra, the City 
Council's revocation of a retail liquor dealer's license 
pursuant to an ordinance allowing such revocation without 
notice where there was reason to believe the business con-
stituted a nuisance, a menace to public health or a 
detriment to peace or morals was held not to be repugnant 
to the state or federal constitution. 
In Floeck v. Bureau of Revenue, 44 N.M. 194, 100 P.2d 
225 (1940), the Court ruled that a statute giving the 
State Revenue Bureau Liquor Control Division the power to 
cancel a license for stated causes without notice or hearing 
was not an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights 
without due process, since the selling of liquor was not a 
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property right, but a revocable privilege and no right to 
a hearing attached thereto unless so provided by statute. 
As late as 1969, in an appeal from an order of sale of a 
liquor license to pay indebtedness, the same Court ruled 
that, though a liquor license was an attachable property 
right vis a vis a third party, there was no vested right 
to such license as against the state. Cantrell v. Carnutt, 
80 N.M. 519, 458 P.2d 594 (1969). 
In State Board of Equalization of California v. The 
Superior Court in and for the City and County of San 
Francisco, 5 Cal. App. 2d 374, 42 P.2d 1075 (1935), in an 
appeal from ~n injunction granted to tavern owners against 
the board, the Court held that the board's independent 
investigation required no notice or hearing when it possessed 
facts sufficient to support the conclusion that grounds 
for revocation existed, since a license was not a property 
right within the meaning of the due process clause. 
Likewise, the Colorado Court, while acknowledging a 
property right in a liquor license, terms such right a 
relatively restricted one subject to the regulations under 
which it is issued. New Safari Lounge, Inc. v. The City of 
Colorado Springs, 567 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1977). In considering 
the summary suspension of a liquor license for violation of 
laws regarding nude entertainment, the court noted that the 
purpose of liquor regulatory laws was to allow the sale of 
alcoholic beverages while protecting the public health, 
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safety, and welfare and that a licensee's rights relative 
to the state were narrow, confined and transitory. There-
fore, a summary suspension followed by a hearing at a 
later time did not violate due process. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the general due 
process requirement of notice and hearing prior to a 
deprivation of a "property right," does not exist for the 
revocation of a mere privilege, especially in the light of 
the fact that independent investigation revealed facts 
sufficient to support the revocation. (State Board of 
Equalization of California, supra), Moreover, JUDD'S 
FRONTIER CLUB had been put on notice repeatedly that their 
operation constituted a nuisance in violation of Section 
7-2 and 7-18 of the Revised Ordinances of Midvale City, 
and Notice and a hearing was had prior to the revocation 
(TR 18-21, 9-17, 289, 149-303). Thus Ordinance 7-18 is 
neither unconstitutional on its face, nor as applied to 
the instant situation. 
POINT VI 
SECTION 7-2 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
MIDVALE CITY, DEFINING A NUISANCE SO AS 
TO INCLUDE ACTS OF AN ESTABLISHMENT'S 
PATRONS DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OR 
EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Section 7-2 of the Revised Ordinances of Midvale City, 
1951, defines a nuisance: 
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Se~. 7-2: The words and phrases used in 
th~s.o:d~n~nce shall have the meanings 
spec~f~ed ~n the State Liquor Control Act 
un~ess a different meaning is clearly 
ev~dent. 
Nuisances: 
Ariy room, house, building, structure ar 
other place or licensed premises where: 
(a) alcoholic beverages are manufactured, 
sold, kept, bartered, stored, given away 
or used, or where persons resort for 
drinking alcoholic beverages contrary to 
the Liquor Control Act of Utah or this 
ordinance, or where (b) Beer is sold 
dispensed, or consumed between the h~urs 
of one o'clock a.m. and seven o'clock a.m. 
or where (c) Minors are permitted to pur-
chase or drink beer or to loiter about or 
are employed thereon, or where (d) Laws or 
ordinances are violated bh licensees, 
a ents, or atrons w~th t e consent or 
now e ge o ~censees upon sue prem~ses 
wh~ch tend to affect the publ~c health, 
eace or morals are hereb declared to be 
The Courts in many jurisdictions, including Utah, are 
willing to find the creating of a nuisance by virtue of the 
acts of those other than the licensee or his agents under 
certain circumstances. The Supreme Court of Utah has 
affirmed an injunction against a business for the creation 
of a nuisance by activities of the business's patrons. In 
Wade v. Fuller, 12 Utah 2d 299, 365 P.2d 802 (1961), the 
operators of a drive-in restaurant appealed an injunction 
issued against them. The Court, reviewing the evidence 
that the business's clientele created loud and disturbing 
noises in the residential area, used vulgar language, caused 
traffic problems, and urinated on neighboring premises, held 
that the operators could be found reasonably responsible for 
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creating a nuisance where they attracted such a clientele. 
Sunset Amusement Company v. Board of Police Commissioners ' 
of the City of Lose Angeles, supra, involved an appeal from 
a mandamus proceeding which upheld the board's denial of an 
application to renew the operating permit of a roller rink. 
The Court affirmed the propriety of a municipality revoking 
a business license where such business created a public 
nuisance where such nuisance was caused by the acts of the 
establishment's patrons. The court noted that while a 
business cannot, in general, be held responsible for gov-
erning conditions beyond its control, it concluded that 
under certain circumstances such as those presented, a 
business catering to the general public would be held 
accountable for the unlawful or immoral behavior of its 
patrons both on and off its premises, especially where 
steps could have been taken by the licensee to help 
alleviate the problem. 
Similarly, in Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of 
Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, the 
Court considered a licensee's liability for patron conduct 
in a license revocation proceeding. The board was sustained 
in its findings that the establishment created a public 
nuisance by permitting or failing to control patron conduct 
which was indecent, lewd and prohibited by law. Police 
testimony as to their arrest of these patrons and police 
observation of such indecent conduct was held sufficient 
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evidence to uphold the board's findings and its revocation 
of the business's operating license. 
In an earlier California case, evidence was held 
sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction for violation of 
a statute prohibiting the conducting of a beer parlor in such 
a manner as to create a public nuisance. People v. Montoya, 
137 Cal. App. 784, 28 P.2d 101 (1933). The Court ruled that 
the presence of disorderly crowds in the vicinity of 
Defendant's establishment and their disruption of the quiet 
neighborhood constituted a violation of the statute. 
The law is thus clear: Where the client conduct is 
not outside the control of the business, Sunset Amusement 
Co., supra, and where the business caters to the public, 
continued noise and disruption in the vicinity has been held 
to be within the business's control, People v. Montoya, 
supra, then the business may be held responsible Wade v. 
Fuller, supra. In view of the repeated acts constituting a 
nuisance by JUDD'S patrons, then it is pursuant to a long 
and respected line of authority that JUDD'S may be held 
liable for the violation of Midvale City Ordinance, Section 
7-2. 
POINT VII 
SECTION 7-2 OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
MIDVALE CITY, DEFINING A NUISMlCE, DOES NOT 
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS BY INSUFFICIENT DEFINITENESS 
OR FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE AS TO THE CONDUCT 
PROHIBITED. 
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The Supreme Court of Utah ruled on the constitutionality 
of a Salt Lake City loitering ordinance in Salt Lake City v. 
Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah, 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
915. Holding that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally 
vague, the Court noted that legislative enactments are 
presumatively valid and constitutional and are not to be 
struck down unless shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision 
and that the burden of such a showing rests with the party 
challenging the enactment. 
In Sunset Amusement Co. v. The Board of Police 
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, the city 
ordinance authorizing denial of an operating license to an 
establishment if such a business would be detrimental to 
the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, or 
general welfare of the public was held to provide adequate 
standards and was not unconstitutionally vague. The Court 
observed that in drafting its ordinances, a municipality 
cannot be expected to isolate and specify all conduct 
proscribed. 
Similarly, in Sultan Turkish Bath, Inc. v. Board of 
Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, the 
Court ruled that an ordinance providing for license 
revocation on evidence that the business was carried on in 
an unlawful, improper, or irregular manner was a sufficiently 
clear and ascertainable standard, and not in violation of 
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due process. 
The Utah Supreme Court held void for vagueness a 
criminal statute requiring registration with the State 
Industrial Commission of a prospective worker, where his 
employer was being struck by any "nationally recognized 
union." State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952). 
In that case, the Court announced its standards for reviewing 
such a constitutional challenge. The Court asserted that a 
statute would not be held void for uncertainty if it might be 
given any sensible practical effect. A statute which forbids 
or requires an act in such vague terms that men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ 
as to its application is violative of due process. However, 
the Court noted that due to the limitations of language, 
neither absolute exactness of expression nor complete pre-
cision of meaning are expected. Here, where a criminal penalty 
was exacted, the Court was unwilling to force a prospective 
worker to judge the national recognition of any particular 
striking union. 
The ordinance in question mentions violations "which 
tend to affect the public health, peace or morals." Surely 
it is within the common understanding (and does not require 
unnecessary guesswork) that such patron conduct as fights, 
noise, accidents, obscene conduct, profanity and trespass 
(requiring a substantial burden placed on Midvale City's 
police force) constitute at the very least an infringement on 
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public health and peace. 
POINT VIII 
THE CITY COUNCIL'S CHARGE AND FINDING THAT 
APPELLANT WAS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 4-25 
OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF MIDVALE CITY, 
REQUIRING LICENSING OF A DANCE HALL, WAS NOT 
IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS OR 
EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS BY REASON OF THEIR 
LACK OF NOTICE OR BY DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT. 
The application for and receipt of a license puts a 
licensee on notice of regulations thereto. Chroma Corporation 
v. County of Adams, 36 Colo App. 345, 543 P.2d 83 (1975). 
The California Court in Sunset Amusement Co. v. Board of 
Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, supra, re-
jected the Appellant's constitutional challenge with regard 
to his notice of municipal ordinances. The Court ruled that 
a business owner is charged with notice of municipal code 
sections regarding regulation of his business or grounds for 
license denial. 
In the case of Condas v. Board of Salt Lake County 
Commissioners, 5 Utah 2d 1, 295 P.2d 829 (1956), which was 
an action for declaratory judgment to construe a county 
ordinance defining a nuisance as any building where dancing 
is permitted. on premises licensed to sell beer, the Utah 
Court held that the statute was not invalid as to holders 
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of beer and cabaret licenses who allegedly were led to 
believe that dancing was permissible by failure of the 
commissioners to complain. 
Earl and Sons Tire Center, Inc. v. City of Boulder 
Board of Appeals, 559 P.2d 236 (Colo. 1977), involved the 
refusal by the chief of the City's Bureau of Fire Prevention 
to grant Plaintiff an exception to the city's sprinkler 
requirement. In ruling on the Plaintiff's appeal from the 
order to install such sprinklers, the Court acknowledged that 
a facially valid municipal regulation may not be discrim-
inatorily enforced, but held that the complainant must show 
more than that the ordinance was not enforced against others. 
There must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination. 
In that case, such showing was insufficient; the fact that 
some other businesses were not in compliance with the 
sprinkler requirement was not enough proof of discriminatory 
enforcement. 
Likewise, in the instant case, the allegation that 
JUDD'S was given no notice of the dancing ordinance does not 
make out a violation of due process or equal protection in 
that the proprietors are charged with notice of such 
ordinance. Further, the charge of discriminatory enforcement 
of that ordinance cannot be proved by a mere showing that 
others similarly situated were not required to obtain a license 
for dancing. "A discriminatory purpose must be shown clearly 
by one claiming discrimination since such a purpose cannot be 
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presumed." State v. Nixon, 10 Wash. App. 355, 517 P.2d 
212 (1973). 
POINT IX 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO 
ENTERTAIN RESPONDENTS ' MOTION AND AMEND 
ITS ORDER. 
On June 25, 1979, the trial Court entered its Order in 
this matter (TR 128-129). This was done without formal 
entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Two (2) 
days later, on June 27, 1979, the Appellants filed their 
Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court (TR 130). Four 
(4) days after the entry of Judgment, on June 29, 1979, 
Respondents filed their Motion to Amend Findings and Order, 
which was granted on the same day (TR 136). Appellants now 
contend that, because their Notice of Appeal was filed 
before the Respondents made their motion, the trial Court 
was without jurisdiction to hear the matter. 
This position is untenable. The relevant Rule here is 
52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It provides: 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made 
not later than ten days after entry of 
judgment, the court may amend its findings 
or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made 
with a motion for a new trial pursuant to 
Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question 
has made in the District Court an objection to 
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such findings or has made either a motion 
to am~nd them, a motion for judgment, or 
a mot~on for a new trial. 
Respondent clearly complied with the ten-day requirement. 
If such compliance could be circumvented by a quick filing 
of a Notice of Appeal, the provisions would cease to have 
any meaning. Wright and Miller, commenting on the nearly 
identical provision in the Federal Rules, state: 
Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil§ 2582 (1971). 
Attacking Appellants' position from a different vantage, 
it can be argued that, since Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law are required by Utah Rule 52(a) and, since Utah Rule 
72 requires appeal to be taken from final judgments, no appeal 
may be properly taken until Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law have been entered. In Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 
481 P.2d 53 (1971), the Court, in fact, made such a deter-
mination, holding that, where the trial Court orally found the 
Defendant in contempt for violation of an injunction, but did 
not make and enter Findings of Fact and Judgment, there was 
no final judgment from which an appeal could be taken. In 
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accord is Valley Bank and Trust Co. v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121, 
1124 (Utah, 1974), where the Court states: 
The timely filing of any of the motions 
allowed by the rules to attack or change 
the findings and judgment involves the 
continuing jurisdiction of the court and 
suspends the running of time on the 
judgment until the motion is ruled upon. 
A final decision to note here is Ellison v. Johnson, 
18 Utah 2d 374, 423 P.2d 657 (1967). There the Appellants 
moved for reversal on grounds that the trial Court did not 
file its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law until 19 
days after entry of judgment. The Court, sustaining the 
judgment below, held that, since Appellants had failed to 
show any prejudice as a result of the late filing, they were 
not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
DATED this ' 1980. 
~~;do.U--rt/~, 
Attorney for Respondents 
7417 South State Street, Suite 1 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
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I hereby certify that three (3) copies of the Brief 
of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to NICK J. 
COLESSIDES, Esq., Attorney for Appellants, 610 East South 
Temple, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 this It' 
day of March, 1980. 
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